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The Color of Justice without Prejudice:
Youth, Race, and Crime in the Case
of the Harlem Six
Carl Suddler
In its time, the case of the Harlem Six captured national headlines, yet its 
significance escapes the public memory and record of many today. Ignited by 
the 1964 death of a white shopkeeper in Harlem, the case and its subsequent 
events resonated across the United States as black youth encounters with the 
carceral state influenced public discourse on youth, race, and crime. This article 
recovers the experiences of the Harlem Six to demonstrate how, by the 1960s, 
constructions of youth criminality were reestablished as a racial problem that 
required state intervention and punitive responses. As New York City officials 
authorized anticrime laws such as “stop-and-frisk” and “no-knock,” which 
contributed to higher arrest rates in mainly black communities, it was the youths 
who bore the brunt of inordinate policing. For the Harlem Six, in particular, 
their narrative reveals the overwhelming power of the state and attests to the 
firmness of race as a crucial determinant in American notions of crime and 
delinquency.
“This is the hardest day of our lives,” William Craig told reporters at a 
crowded news conference outside the New York State Supreme Court on April 
4, 1973. Having spent nearly a decade in jail on a first-degree murder charge, 
Craig was one of the four Harlem Six youths released after pleading guilty to 
the lesser manslaughter charge; the other two continued to serve sentences. The 
court’s promise of freedom forced the four young men to make the pragmatic 
decision rather than face the uncertainty of another trial for the 1964 murder 
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of Margit Sugar, a white secondhand clothes dealer in Harlem. The three 
previous trials were complicated, and it became clear that nobody wanted to go 
through another trial that promised an uncertain verdict. In recognition of the 
overwhelming power of the state, the difficult decision was made to accept guilt 
for an offense in which they upheld their innocence.1
What started on a sunny April day in 1964, the case of the Harlem Six 
confirmed the persistence of race as a decisive factor in American notions of 
crime and delinquency. A sequence of events that spanned four decades, the 
intertwined stories of William Craig, Wallace Baker, Walter Thomas, Ronald 
Felder, Daniel Hamm, and Robert Rice—the latter two were released in 1974 and 
1991—expand our understanding of youth encounters with the carceral state in 
the second half of the twentieth century. Black youths account for a bulk of the 
young people who enter the justice system; however, their experiences continue 
to elude the broader historical narrative being shaped around the carceral state. 
Because the historical sources tend to be about youths, not from them, a great 
deal of the scholarship is rarely from their perspective. The combined archive 
accessed to retell the story of the Harlem Six allows us firsthand insight to how 
black youths, some criminalized by association, navigated the expansive justice 
system in the urban North.2
For all its particularities, the story of the Harlem Six points to a critical 
juncture in the carceral turn in the City That Never Sleeps. However, the 
experiences for black youths in New York City, as James Baldwin poignantly 
describes, was “true of every Northern city with a large Negro population” 
because in the “supposed bastion of liberalism,” they contested the status 
quo for fair housing and public schools in addition to a better justice system. 
The case of the Harlem Six demonstrates that despite important moments of 
progress in the first half of the twentieth century, crime was recast as a racial 
problem that warranted punitive state responses, and efforts to create a fair and 
impartial justice system gave way to systemic and institutionalized racism. By 
the 1960s, anticrime laws, most notably stop-and-frisk and no-knock, were 
disproportionately being enforced in mainly black communities; the police were 
reaffirming their positions as the “frontline soldiers” for the impending War on 
Crime; and black youths continued to bear the burden of a justice system that 
denied their innocence and presumed their criminality.3
“Harlem Is a Police State”:
Creating the Climate for Civil Unrest
“The police in Harlem, their presence is like occupation forces, like an 
occupying army,” Malcolm X told the audience at the Militant Labor Forum of 
New York on May 29, 1964. “They’re not in Harlem to protect us; they’re not 
in Harlem to look out for our welfare,” he continued. “They’re in Harlem to 
protect the interests of the businessmen who don’t even live there.” Having just 
returned from a trip abroad, Malcolm X’s charges concerning the police state 
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in Harlem reinforced many of the claims made by other Harlem residents and 
organizations. In 1964, the temper of central Harlem had grown sullen as its 
residents faced a surge in police presence directly connected to new anticrime 
laws and a “hate-gang scare” in the print media. Combined with the political 
buzz surrounding Harlem, this created an environment that sparked both major 
and minor incidents between the police and the community.4
The incident that sparked the case of the Harlem Six took place on April 
17, 1964, when a fruit stand was overturned by black and Puerto Rican youths 
around 128th Street and Lenox Avenue. The documented reports of the “Harlem 
Fruit Riot” changed over time; however, the one constant that remained was 
when the police showed up to stop the youngsters from smacking each other 
with apples and oranges; the youths then “changed their targets, hurling fruit at 
the policemen.” The policemen apprehended several of the youngsters and sent 
out a call for help to which roughly twenty-five more police responded. Several 
of the eyewitness accounts that detailed what ensued were disturbing. In a 
tape-recorded statement with a representative of Harlem Youth Opportunities 
Unlimited (HARYOU), Wallace Baker, nineteen, recalled seeing “some little 
boys picking up fruit from the ground” when three policemen “grab[bed] one 
between his legs and [got] ready to hit him with a stick.” Baker continued, “So 
I ran over and tried to stop him. And two of them jumped on me and beat me for 
nothing.” Baker was then put in the patrol car and handcuffed to Daniel Hamm, 
eighteen, who also intervened “to keep him [the policeman] from shooting the 
kids.” For Baker and Hamm, this marked the beginning of a long struggle with 
the justice system.5
For many Harlem residents, the “policemen’s inept handling of a minor 
situation” reinforced their skepticism of the heightened police presence in the 
community. “The black people of Harlem have come to understand the situation 
quite well,” one writer wrote in Challenge, a weekly newspaper funded by 
the Harlem Progressive Labor Movement. “When the deal goes down, these 
cops will murder, maim, and brutalize the Negro people of New York just as 
fast as their partners in the south.” For youth in particular, trepidation toward 
law enforcement existed for years; however, in this moment, the newly 
prepared stop-and-frisk and no-knock state laws roused a different antipolice 
sentiment—a feeling fueled with dishonesty and injustice.6
These two bills were proposed at a conference with New York Governor 
Nelson A. Rockefeller in January 1964, and the top law enforcement officials 
from New York City agreed on the terms “to reestablish law and order.” The two 
bills, stop-and-frisk and no-knock, implemented particular proposals to combat 
crime, as they clarified the rights of police to frisk suspects and expanded the 
use of search warrants to be executed without notice to the occupants of a 
building. According to the 1964 Uniform Crime Reports, New York City was 
engulfed with street crime, reporting a 23 percent increase since the turn of 
the decade. “In an era in which crime is increasing four times as fast as the 
population” as said by Governor Rockefeller, these new laws were needed 
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“because of the uncertainty in the present law and because the police must be 
provided now with the sound tools to carry out their sworn duty to protect the 
public against serious crimes.” These anticrime bills were not passed without 
protest from liberal Republican and Democratic legislators, African American 
political organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People (NAACP) and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and 
resident New Yorkers from all parts of the city. Nor were they passed without 
countless victims, mostly youths of color who became familiarized with the 
criminal justice system for the first time.7
In the case of stop-and-frisk, it was reasoned, the uncertainty that existed 
around detainments caused tumult between citizens and police because 
policemen were rarely certain whether a detention was constitutionally valid. 
Police officials argued that the mandatory exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio 
restricted effective police action. Prior to the 1961 Supreme Court decision, 
which declared evidence obtained in direct violation of the Fourth Amendment 
that prohibits unreasonable search and seizures could not be used in criminal 
prosecutions, half of the country’s state courts, including New York, permitted 
incriminating evidence in state and federal courts regardless of how it was 
seized. Police officials demanded their state legislature pass a law that “would 
permit a policeman to detain and frisk a suspect on the grounds of reasonable 
suspicion, thereby eliminating the necessity of grounds for arrest.” Thus, urged 
by law enforcement agencies including district attorneys, police chiefs, sheriffs, 
the state police, the State Commission of Investigation, and the State Council 
of Churches, New York enacted a stop-and-frisk statute. The bill was passed by 
a near-party-line vote of thirty-three to twenty-two—only one Democrat voted 
for it and only one Republican against it.8
There was less opposition to the “no-knock” bill that the Senate approved 
by a vote of forty-three to twelve. The “no-knock” law allowed policemen 
to break open a door or window without prior notice to the occupants of the 
building to execute a search warrant. The bill’s proponents, who included 
Governor Rockefeller and New York City Mayor Robert F. Wagner, argued the 
necessity for such a law was twofold. One, the element of surprise did not allow 
the occupants time to destroy convictable evidence. “Such evidence as narcotics 
or policy slips are often thrown out of windows or flushed down toilets before 
police can seize it,” New York Assemblyman Richard J. Bartlett imparted. The 
other aim of the bill was to protect police officers. According to Bartlett, “A 
policeman who knocks or announces that he is about to enter often gives the 
suspect enough warning to get out a gun or a knife.” Although the stop-and-
frisk law dominated the headlines, perhaps rightfully so, the combination of 
the two anticrime laws drastically transformed the relationship between police 
authority and the residents of New York, especially in Harlem.9
Opponents of the new anticrime laws in New York questioned their 
constitutionality and vagueness. Of the stop-and-frisk bill, a representative of 
the State Bar Association who argued for the bills to be vetoed said, “Nowhere, 
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in the history of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence have we so closely approached 
a police state as in this proposal to require citizens to identify themselves to 
police officers and ‘explain their actions’ on such a meager showing.” Even 
the less opposed no-knock bill, according to the association, “flies in the face 
of a long-established policy that ‘a man’s home is his castle,’ and for the state 
to invade it, it must strictly comply with safeguards which have been found to 
be important over the years.” African Americans from the Harlem Progressive 
Labor Movement were more direct in their critique of the laws, describing them 
“as close to any of Hitler’s laws as any other law in this country.” But these 
concerns were met with a straightforward rebuttal: times have changed.10
The New York City Police Department, at least according to Police 
Commissioner Michael J. Murphy, had its hands full in 1964. Not only did these 
two laws impede the perception of police throughout the city, especially among 
communities of color, but it also added to the visibility of the police state being 
established. Fully aware that “police are confronted with serious problems in 
1964; problems not encountered a few brief years ago,” Commissioner Murphy 
negotiated complicated terrain. On the one hand, with the World’s Fair set to 
embark on New York City, the police were responsible to preserve the peace and 
protection of the people. “As the threats and boasts of wild and unreasonable 
actions” loomed, the police commissioner showed an ardent stance on crime 
because he believed “the show of strength is the greatest deterrent to unlawful 
action.” And as a result, more than 25,000 men were assigned to twelve-hour 
shifts throughout the city.11
On the other hand, the hordes of police brutality charges that the department 
confronted, including those stemming from the “Harlem Fruit Riot,” suggest that 
the department’s strength was not just a show. The national director of CORE, 
James Farmer, declared, “Police brutality in our city is not a problem which 
began or ended with the World’s Fair.” Farmer pointed to several instances in 
which excessive police force was utilized, and he concluded that there existed 
“an ongoing problem of police violence against individual Negroes and Puerto 
Rican unjustified and unprovoked.” But according to Police Commissioner 
Murphy, his police force was being “subjected to unfair abuse and undeserved 
criticism” from those who sought “to destroy their effectiveness and to leave 
the city open to confusion.” Contrary to what the CORE director penned in his 
statement, which captured the viewpoint of those throughout the streets of New 
York City, the police commissioner was adamant in saying, “There is no pattern 
of brutality in the New York City Police Department. There has not been—there 
will never be.”12
If in fact Police Commissioner Murphy’s eradication of brutality allegations 
were true, the masses of black New Yorkers never received the memo. For those 
youngsters involved in the fruit stand fracas, in particular, the course of their 
lives was significantly altered by their interactions with the police on that day. 
Once the confrontation ended and several members of the crowd were taken 
away in patrol cars to the 135th Street station, unbeknownst to the authorities, 
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about thirty youths followed and formed a picket line chanting, “Stop police 
brutality!” Outside of the police station, the marching and chanting lasted for 
three hours; inside, according to their recorded testimonies, the police brutality 
was just starting. “When they got us to the precinct station,” Wallace Baker 
detailed, “they beat us practically all that day, and then at night they took us to 
Harlem Hospital to get X-rays.” Daniel Hamm’s experience was similar. “They 
beat us till I could barely walk and my back was in pain,” Hamm described. 
“They got so tired beating us they just came in and start spitting on us.” The 
police department denied all accusations.13
The evidence pertaining to the beatings these youths suffered proved 
otherwise. The mothers of both Baker and Hamm affirmed their sons’ 
testimonies and contacted a black lawyer, George Sena, to defend their claims. 
In a tape-recorded statement with an interviewer from HARYOU, Mrs. Baker 
remembered going to the hospital “to sign for Wally because they thought they 
had broke his neck.” “His neck was over one-sided,” Mrs. Baker described. “He 
had a patch right across his lip, [and] his face was swollen.” Daniel Hamm’s 
mother was unaware of the disturbance that led to her son’s arrest. “They didn’t 
call me,” Mrs. Hamm stated. But when she was finally permitted to see Daniel, 
she remembered, “He couldn’t pull up his pants. He had a blood clot on each 
leg.” Their attorney, Sena, used this evidence to plead their case for release.14
The next morning, Sena argued to the presiding judge, Maurice W. Grey, 
that his clients were “beaten by police after they had been arrested” for asking an 
officer “why he was beating another youth.” The youngsters accompanied Sena 
in court, wearing bandages; however, Judge Grey dismissed the police brutality 
charge and told attorney Sena “to take his complaint to Police Commissioner 
Michael J. Murphy.” The young men were forced to post $500 bails, except 
Daniel Hamm, who was paroled in consideration of possible hardship to his 
widowed mother, and they were charged with assault and malicious mischief. 
Unfortunately for Baker and Hamm, they and four of their friends were 
rearrested within days of the fruit stand incident. This time, they were being 
charged with the murder of Margit Sugar, a white secondhand clothes dealer in 
Harlem. Such allegations bestowed on these six black youths incited racial and 
political disarray throughout New York City.15
“They Don’t Want Us on the Street”:
Policing Black Youths with Fear
“The police were afraid of everything in Harlem,” James Baldwin wrote in 
“A Report from Occupied Territory.” “This means that the citizens of Harlem, 
who, as we have seen,” Baldwin continued, “can come to grief at any hour 
in the streets, and who are not safe at their windows, are forbidden the very 
air.” Baldwin’s articulation of living in occupied territory poetically described 
what many black New Yorkers experienced in the mid-1960s, especially the 
youth. “The children, having seen the spectacular defeat of their fathers—
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having seen what happens to any bad nigger and, still more, what happens to 
the good ones—cannot listen to their fathers,” Baldwin avowed, “and certainly 
will not listen to the society which is responsible for their orphaned condition.” 
Moreover, speaking directly to the case of the Harlem Six and the passing of the 
stop-and-frisk and no-knock laws, Baldwin asserted that black people in New 
York City were no longer safe from the occupying forces of the state, not even 
in their own homes. “Harlem believes, and I certainly agree,” he wrote, “that 
these laws are directed against Negroes.”16
People close to the case believed, like Baldwin, that the pursuit of these 
six youths started even before the fruit stand incident. Because of the new 
anticrime laws and the heightened police state in Harlem, certain actions and 
behaviors started attracting police attention and impacted youth perspectives 
of carceral authorities in the city, particularly the police. Some behaviors were 
tied to the elevated political climate in New York City and included rent strikes, 
school boycotts, spontaneous picketing, demonstrations, and the formation of 
militant rank and file. Others included innocent acts of adolescence, such as 
pigeon keeping. Many youths were pigeon fanciers, and they kept and trained 
pigeons on the roofs of residential buildings. One youth, not connected to the 
Six, explained to a New York Times reporter that he “hated” the police because 
“they took our pigeons.” The youth told the reporter about a confrontation with 
a policeman who accused him and his friends of “hiding bricks” on the roof. 
All of the Harlem Six were pigeon fanciers, and though there was no record of 
their having run-ins with the police because of this hobby, they were all very 
aware of the youths who did. At an open forum in Harlem after the fruit stand 
riot, before his arrest, Hamm pointed to the constant harassment from police 
and expressed, “They don’t want us on the street”—a message they all heard 
loud and clear.17
The New York Times printed the first detailed account on the murder of 
Margit Sugar under the headline “3 Youths Seized in Harlem Killing: A Racial 
Motive in Recent Assaults Is Investigated.” The writer goes into detail about 
three “Negro youths” who were arrested in connection with the fatal stabbing 
of a Harlem shopkeeper and the wounding of her husband, Frank Sugar, who 
was in fair condition at Physicians’ Hospital in Jackson Heights in Queens. 
Frank Sugar told police that a group of boys entered the store just before 5:00 
p.m. and took up position around the shop. He recounted, “When one of the 
youths asked to see a suit, Mrs. [Margit] Sugar replied that they had none in 
his size.” Another youth then drew a knife and stabbed the woman once in the 
heart. The commotion in the store caused the operator of the adjacent drugstore 
to come over and see what was going on. The drugstore operator, Julius 
Levitt, described seeing a group of youths run out of the clothing store, and he 
called the police. The following morning, Ronald Felder, Walter Thomas, and 
William Craig were arrested and arraigned on charges of felonious assault and a 
violation of the weapons law; the homicide charge was held open until it could 
be determined which “boy did the killing.”18
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Coverage of the assault continued the next day in the New York Times when 
they printed a photograph of young Robert Rice and Daniel Hamm attached 
to an article connecting the youths to the death of Margit Sugar. “Altogether, 
five teen-agers have been arrested in the shopkeeper’s murder,” longtime New 
York Times reporter Martin Arnold stated, “and a sixth [was] being sought.” 
The police issued an alarm that spanned a thirteen-state radius in their efforts to 
capture the sixth, Wallace Baker, who was believed to have “actually stabbed 
Mrs. Sugar to death.” As a result, the hunt for Baker received national attention; 
however, on May 5, Baker, accompanied by his lawyer, George Sena, turned 
himself in. With the Six officially in police custody, perhaps the most important 
question yet to be answered was, Why were six Black youths all arrested, 
indicted, and arraigned for a murder that the police say “was committed by one 
stroke of a knife in a human heart by one bloody hand.” Why so many?19
A multiple accusation of such hostility can fix an ugly stain on a whole 
race or nationality. Otherwise, it would just be a random act of violence. There 
were the Scottsboro Seven and the Trenton Six. “Whenever a crescendo of 
racist fear and guilt begins to build in the white community,” according to the 
novelist Truman Nelson, who published a great deal in support of the Harlem 
Six, “it seems that it must always be resolved by a frenzied hue and cry, brutal 
arrests, and hysterical trial of multiple black defendants accused of a crime so 
monstrous that the whole apparatus of the state backed by a totally terrorized 
and convinced public opinion can be brought into a direct onslaught against 
them.” This was indeed true in the case of the Harlem Six.20
From the onset of their arrest through all the events that followed, the 
Harlem Six experienced harsh treatment by the various authoritative figures—
the police, their lawyers, the courts—they encountered, reinforcing their notions 
about the unjust powers of the state. Aside from Wallace Baker, who turned 
himself in to police custody, the other five youths and their families faced no-
knock enforcement in their arrests. “On the night of April the twenty-ninth,” 
two months before the stop-and-frisk and no-knock laws were set to become 
official, Mrs. Craig, William’s mother, recalled hearing a noise coming from 
the roof. She opened her door to look out and saw roughly twenty men, some 
coming up the stairs and some down from the roof. “One walked to the door and 
he asked me if this was where Billy Craig lived,” Mrs. Craig recollected. “I said 
Billy Craig? No, there’s no Billy Craig here. There’s a Willie Craig live here.” 
But William was out running an errand. This did not prevent the policemen 
to go in to Craig’s room, and four of the men stayed in the house to wait for 
Craig’s arrival. “The others left, and I’d say about forty-five minutes later,” 
Mrs. Craig stated, “one come up the stairs and say we got him.” William’s 
mother followed the police officers back to the precinct, where she waited 
hours for any questions to be answered. Mrs. Craig left the police station per 
a detective’s request to “go home and get some rest so you can be in court in 
the morning, ’cause we are keeping these boys.” “I didn’t know why they were 
holding them no more than just as assault,” Mrs. Craig explained. “I couldn’t 
The Color of Justice without Prejudice  65
think of anywhere I could go for help. I felt everything was hopeless.” When 
she arrived back home, Mrs. Craig’s daughter and neighbor told her that they 
saw the “three boys on television” and that they were arrested for murder.21
Each of the six mothers, including Wallace Baker’s mother, shared similar 
stories of the day their sons were arrested and faced death sentences. Mrs. Rice, 
Robert’s mother, was said to have weighed 152 pounds before her son’s arrest 
and dropped to 125 pounds within a month. “I haven’t been able to eat a meal 
since all this started. All I do is smoke and drink coffee,” Mrs. Rice told Selma 
Sparks, a feature writer for Challenge who interviewed the six mothers to reveal 
“what it feels like to be a black mother in a white world when your child is 
being framed and tortured.” Sparks’s interviews were published in a pamphlet 
titled “A Harlem Mother’s Nightmare: The Story of Six Harlem Youths Who 
Face Possible Death for a Crime They Did Not Commit.” Committed to 
raise awareness and money to help defend the Harlem Six, the Committee to 
Defend Resistance to Ghetto Life (CERGE), a New York–based defense front 
organization for the Progressive Labor Movement and its affiliates, promoted 
the pamphlet and launched a national, arguably international, campaign to free 
the Harlem Six, and their mothers led the charge.22
It was Truman Nelson’s The Torture of Mothers, a self-published account 
of the mothers’ experiences and the early media coverage on the case of the 
Harlem Six, that established the national conversation and “create[d] publicity 
and public indignation.” Nelson, a white northerner, held little qualms in what 
he knew to be “a racial incident.” “If six Irishmen kill a Jew, if six Jews kill a 
Pole, if six Poles kill a Negro, if six Negroes kill a white,” Nelson expressed, 
“the guilt is flung in the face of a whole people.” In the case of the Harlem Six, 
Nelson indeed believed this to be true. The work was not without its skeptics, 
however. An unlabeled letter mailed to Beacon Press, which eventually decided 
to publish the work in late 1965 “with the hope that the book will now attract the 
concern which it deserves,” described Nelson’s work as “frank propaganda.” 
The unnamed writer professed that the book only “succeeds in demonstrating 
to a white reader how far removed he is from the kind of justice, the kind of 
law, and the police the Negro knows.” This was certainly true; however, in his 
time of writing, Nelson never proclaimed to do more than expose the injustices 
the six youths and their families faced. He built his case around the Harlem Six 
mothers and their “excruciating torture, which comes out of love.” “It comes 
out of uncertainty and fear,” Nelson wrote, “out of wanting to protect, in this 
case, and not being able to find the object of the compulsion to protect.” Such 
a tone set the tone for the first trial, which began in March 1965—ten months 
after their arrests.23
“They Are All Your Children”: Freeing the Harlem Six
“No one in Harlem,” James Baldwin wrote, “will ever believe the Harlem 
Six are guilty—God knows their guilt has certainly not been proved.” Baldwin 
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voiced what many Black New Yorkers, especially Harlemites, felt about the 
six youths who faced the death penalty for a felonious murder charge. “Harlem 
knows, though, that they have been abused and . . . possibly destroyed, and 
Harlem knows why—we have lived with it since our eyes opened on the world.” 
Yet the worst ordeal of the mothers was still to come. The six mothers formed 
the Mother Defense Committee “in an effort to free their children.” Such a feat 
proved to be a daunting challenge they were prepared to accept.24
Although countless Harlem residents wanted to trust that the Six were 
in fact innocent, not many were forthcoming in their defense. “Everybody 
turned their back on us and gave us the run-around,” Walter Thomas’s mother 
remembered. Mrs. Hamm supported this claim, testifying that a representative 
of the NAACP told her that “they wouldn’t touch the case with a ten-foot pole.” 
Even George Sena, who represented the youths after the fruit stand debacle, 
denied the role to defend the Six in their case against the death of Margit Sugar. 
It was generally believed, at least according to Truman Nelson, that “somehow 
the press had been able to implant in them a new form of original sin.” Counter 
to their advocates, the media portrayal of the Harlem Six was able to convince 
many members of the community “that they were killers because they were 
black.”25
A significant portion of the media connected the murder of Margit Sugar to 
“four other Harlem murders, all of white persons,” and associated the Harlem 
Six to an antiwhite Harlem gang indoctrinated by rebel Black Muslims. Junius 
Griffin, an African American reporter for the New York Times, broke the story on 
the “Blood Brothers” of Harlem and reported that the gang had upward of 400 
members. Griffin, who claimed to have received the information on the youth 
gang from a HARYOU researcher, implicated the Harlem Six, particularly 
Wallace Baker and Daniel Hamm, in his front-page story, stating, “The gang 
last clashed with the police on April 17 on the east side of Lenox Avenue. . . . 
Two members of the gang were arrested in that clash and were later implicated 
in the fatal stabbing of a white woman on April 29.”26
The presence of a Harlem gang “indoctrinated in hatred of all white 
persons” was quarrelsome for everyone. A day after the New York Times printed 
its initial report of the antiwhite Harlem gang, it published a detailed account 
of how the police were addressing the problem. To investigate the gang’s 
existence, Griffin reported, “more than 40 Negro police undercover men moved 
into Harlem yesterday.” They fanned out into community centers, restaurants, 
bars, and “other haunts where members of the gang [were] reported to gather 
during and after school hours.” When challenged to present evidence, however, 
Griffin and the New York Times denied all requests.27
There were some African American organization leaders who, unsure if 
the gang existed, admitted it would not be surprising if such a group did. For 
example, James Farmer, the national director of CORE, wrote, “I think the 
Blood Brothers are merely another indication of the sickness of our society. 
They reflect the growing anger, frustration and sense of hopelessness in the 
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Negro ghetto, especially among our youth, most of whom are unemployed.” Be 
that as it may, black media outlets were not as willing to accept the existence 
of the “Blood Brothers” and warned its audience of the possibilities that may 
arise if they accept what has emerged elsewhere. The New York branches of 
the NAACP and CORE demanded that “the city to produce the facts to justify 
the hysteria that has been created.” Whether the intentions were to better the 
business opportunities for non-Harlem residents to feel more comfortable 
moving to Harlem or to permit the establishment of the heightened police 
presence, Marshall England, chairman of the New York CORE, articulated that 
reports were “an indication of how far the white press will go to create hysteria.” 
In the end, the gang’s existence eluded all evidence presented; however, the 
damage was done.28
In their initial hearings, largely because of Griffin’s reports, the Harlem Six 
faced questions such as, “Are you a follower of Islam?,” “How do you get your 
X?,” and “Where do you fellows practice your karate?” The assistant district 
attorney, Robert J. Lehner, even asked Daniel Hamm directly, “When Rice 
[Robert] called you brother, what does he mean?” To which Hamm responded, 
“Just something new that come in the street. Instead of pal it’s brother.” The 
implication in these questions was directly tied to the idea that the Six belonged 
to the “Blood Brother” gang that was never proved to be more than a myth. The 
hysteria, unfortunately, was not.29
Because of the hysteria, though, many lawyers believed providing a 
credible defense was going to be extremely difficult, even if they knew the 
“Blood Brother” connection was untrue. Those close to the case of the Harlem 
Six labored to find an attorney to conduct their defense. As a result, after their 
arraignment, one lawyer signed a notice of appearance for all the youths. This 
meant that when any other lawyer, whether chosen by their mothers or not, 
asked for permission to see the boys, he or she would be denied. The mothers 
believed that the lawyer who signed the notice of appearance did so for the 
money; the court-appointed lawyer was “paid $2,500 per boy.” Like most 
people in Harlem, the mothers and their sons both had a deep distrust of court-
appointed counsel, and they refused to settle.30
The Mothers Defense Committee was determined to obtain a defense 
counsel they were confident in; however, as Mrs. Baker acknowledged, “We 
didn’t know where to go, we didn’t know where to turn.” Their next option 
was William Epton, a black communist who at the time was the head of the 
Harlem Defense Council. An ardent opponent of the no-knock and stop-and-
frisk laws, what he referred to as “the northern version of the Black Codes,” 
Epton was hesitant to take on the case out of fear that “Rockefeller, Wagner, 
and ‘Bull’ Murphy” would use his radicalism against him. Even though Epton 
denounced his affiliation with the Communist Party in 1964 “because it no 
longer represented the aspirations in general of the working class or the black 
people in particular,” the stigma was still prevalent.31
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Epton suggested that the Mothers Defense Committee talk their situation 
over with Conrad Lynn, a civil rights attorney who had recently defended Epton 
on a charge of illegal assembly. Known for his “oratorical power . . . openness, 
compassion, and above all . . . innate sense of righteousness and prophecy 
that was the hallmark of the great abolitionists of the 1850s,” Lynn seemed to 
be the perfect fit. Truman Nelson, a Lynn supporter and friend, described the 
attorney as “a small man, and black, and his smallness and blackness gives the 
effusions of indestructibility and fearlessness.” Nelson admitted it was easy for 
him “to understand how the mothers must have felt sitting before him for the 
first time.” Lynn agreed and assembled a group of distinguished attorneys that 
included Mary Kaufman, William Kunstler, Sam Neuberger, and Gene Condon. 
He accepted the case because he believed “the so-called Blood Brother murder 
is one pre-eminently showing the influence of dominant prejudice against a 
minority which is deprived of defenses.” Lynn also informed the mothers of 
the Six that actual hard proof of the crime by the boys is missing, and “the 
prosecution is depending on the existing state of prejudice to obtain conviction.” 
Placing his faith in the mothers’ testimony, Lynn was convinced the boys were 
innocent and accepted the task at hand.32
The first step for Lynn and his team proved to be the first hurdle. Sought 
to represent the Harlem Six, Lynn stated, “My colleagues and I have surveyed 
every scrap of the alleged ‘evidence,’ and, without a doubt, we believe these six 
black youths to be innocent.” But because there was already a court-appointed 
attorney, the court invoked a ruling that denied Lynn’s group the defense. Not 
surprised by the judge’s decision to keep the assigned attorney, Lynn expressed 
his dissatisfaction with “the judge [who] would refuse to appoint any lawyer 
except the particular political hack in the Democratic Club whom they wished 
to favor at the moment.” Lynn’s group immediately motioned to the Supreme 
Court for a writ of habeas corpus to free the Harlem Six on the grounds that they 
were being denied the right to counsel. He argued, “The practice of the courts 
in assigning lawyers against the wishes of indigent clients was to practice a 
difference in defense based on property qualifications.” Confident that the 
precedent set in the Scottsboro case to use the class status of the defendants 
would persuade the judge to reconsider, Lynn and his team were once again 
denied. Judge Julius Helfand, who adjudicated the habeas corpus hearing, was 
unwilling to fold on the class distinction. Judge Helfand was more convinced by 
the attorney general’s argument: “If you let these people pick their own lawyer, 
pretty soon the indigents in the hospitals will be picking their own doctors and 
surgeons.” Judge Helfand dismissed the plea of the six youths and ordered them 
to go on trial for their lives.33
A retrial for the Six was crucial for many reasons. First, and perhaps most 
important, the boys were no longer subjected to the attorneys appointed by the 
court. For Lynn and his associates, attaining a fair environment for this case 
was a fight they refused to drop. In one instance, the lawyers demanded that 
Supreme Court Justice Gerald P. Culkin “be censured for his racial slurs.” When 
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the Six appeared before Culkin to attempt to change their counsel, Culkin said, 
“These boys wouldn’t know a good attorney from a good watermelon.” Fritz 
Alexander, president of the Harlem Lawyer Association, expressed to Lynn and 
his team that the association “found no racial offense in the statement Culkin 
made.” On a separate occasion, according to Lynn and William Kunstler, one 
court-appointed lawyer “died in court from acute alcoholism while the first trial 
was in progress.” These kinds of occurrences marred the first trial throughout, 
but the retrial would now allow Lynn and his associates to take over the case on 
a more permanent and official basis.34
Second, from the time the Six were convicted in 1964 to the order for 
a retrial, the death penalty underwent a number of changes in New York. In 
1965, state legislation passed a law limiting the death penalty “to murder in the 
first degree when the victim was a peace officer performing his or her official 
duties, when the defendant was serving a life sentence at the time the crime 
was committed, if the crime was committed when the defendant was serving an 
indeterminate sentence of at least fifteen years to life, or if the defendant was 
in immediate flight from penal custody or confinement when the crime was 
committed.” Further, the law prohibited the death penalty for persons under 
the age of eighteen when the crime was committed and did not impose the 
death penalty “when substantial mitigating circumstances existed.” Some more 
amendments were added in 1967 and 1968, though what mattered most was the 
Harlem Six would no longer be facing the electric chair—only life in prison. 
And, finally, the order for a retrial meant the six youths—Rice, Hamm, Baker, 
Felder, Craig, and Thomas—were to now be tried separately. The New York 
Court of Appeals said, “When a defendant confesses to a crime, he must be 
given his own trial apart from the trials of his co-defendants.” In this particular 
instance, because Rice and Hamm “confessed” to knifing the Sugars, each was 
set to face a jury of his peers individually; a joint trial was set for Wallace, 
Thomas, Felder, and Craig, who “stoutly maintained their innocence.”35
After the Court of Appeals reversal, there was a new emergence of 
support for the Harlem Six. Because Rice and Hamm were tried and sentenced 
separately, the public started to follow the “Harlem Four” case closely. 
Following three mistrials, all of which resulted in hung juries, relatives and 
supporters demanded the removal of the assistant district attorney, Robert 
Lehner, who had prosecuted the case for more than seven years. Ossie Davis, 
a well-known black actor and activist, called the case “an outrage,” and he 
called for the Harlem Four, “who have been denied bail since their arrest seven 
years ago,” to be released immediately and renounced of all charges. Various 
petitions supported this call, including one signed by countless psychiatrists, 
psychologists, social workers, and psychoanalysts who believed another trial 
“would impose unbearable psychological stress on these young men.”36
The charges were not recanted, and a fourth trial was set for the Harlem 
Four. This trial, according to Lynn and his group, was “expected to last about 
a month,” and the new jury was going to “hear most of the same witnesses 
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who testified at previous trials.” While this remained pretty standard, à la the 
first three mistrials, there were some new additions that made this trial seem 
different. The New York Times assigned a new reporter to the case, Lacey 
Fosburgh, whose first article on the Harlem Six reintroduced the case to a new 
audience of readers who may have lost track over the course of seven years. 
Perhaps most notably in Fosburgh’s report, all connections to an “anti-white 
hate gang” were absent, and the case was presented as “six teen-agers [who 
were a part of] an unholy plot to kill proprietors.” Fosburgh also made an effort 
to humanize the defendants. There was mention of Walter Thomas’s nine-year-
old daughter, who spent most of her young life with her father in jail, as well 
as William Craig’s poems that were exhibited in the Countee Cullen Library in 
Harlem.37
In addition to the new reporter, there was also a new audience—one that 
included young boys and young girls who saw themselves in the defendants. “I 
can’t help thinking that could be me,” Vaughan Dweck, thirteen, told a New York 
Times reporter. “I’d be scared if I was up there like that. All those years waiting 
and wondering was going to happen to you,” Dweck continued. “I’d be scared 
and I’d be real glad to see someone like me sitting here watching.” Dweck was 
one of more than 100 youths who regularly attended the trial that was opened 
to the public at the Criminal Court Building. Richard M. Edelman, an eighth-
grade social studies teacher from the Fieldston School, was just one of many 
teachers who believed that “the unusual elements in this case—its long history, 
the fact that it focuses on a murder and, particularly, the defendants’ youth—
combine to intrigue the students.” Edelman, whose students were assigned to 
write reflection paragraphs after their day in the courtroom, quickly learned 
that “the essays revealed the realization that the four boys had been held in jail 
without bail during a crucial period in their life was confusing and troublesome.” 
Even some younger relatives of the Harlem Six were writing letters and being 
engaged. For example, Cheryl Samuels, thirteen-year-old cousin of Ronald 
Felder, wrote a letter to the Harlem Six disclosing her experience. “When I was 
ten I’d hear a cousin of mine was in jail but I didn’t know what for,” Samuels 
wrote. “Now that I’m 13 I can really do a little something to help. Pass out 
leaflets in court that a girl in my class made and a lot of other things that real 
help get the news around.” Lynn and William Kunstler, who by this point in the 
trial had taken a more prominent role in the defense, welcomed the youths who 
showed up because they believed that “interest among the young in the legal 
system should be encouraged.” It also boosted their defense.38
After the three-month trial and days of jury deliberations, the jurors found 
themselves “hopelessly deadlocked,” and Supreme Court Justice Joseph A. 
Martinis issued another mistrial—except for the first time, Thomas, Felder, 
Craig, and Baker were set to be released on bail. But, as Lewis M. Steel, a 
member of the defense team put it, “How can poor black people raise $75,000?” 
The sum total to be paid, Steel argued, was so high as to amount to no bail at all. 
“I expected after eight years they would be released in their own recognizance.” 
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But Justice Martinis felt he was doing the boys a favor “in all good conscience.” 
Bail was not posted.39
Satisfied with the defendants’ inability to pay the fee, the assistant district 
attorney characterized the Harlem Four as “much too dangerous to be granted 
bail.” William Craig responded directly to Lehner in the courtroom. “Then 
indict me for it!” The judge warned Craig to be quiet, and Craig declined. 
“I’ve been sitting here quiet for too long,” he voiced, “through damned near 
four trials, and I’m not going to keep quiet as long as you keep talking about 
this justice business.” Craig’s vented frustration vocalized an undercurrent 
of distrust, which many black youths shared, in the justice system. One trip 
through his poem exhibit at the Countee Cullen Library would have anticipated 
Craig’s outpouring. In a poem titled “Power,” he wrote, “After seven and a 
half years of being promised justice and fairness, We, the ‘Harlem 6,’ as well 
as any poor black person, have received injustice and partialness.” No longer 
able to believe in the courts, Craig declared, “The residing judge promises 
justice, but the moment his mouth opens there’s a great contradition [sic] and 
all motions are denied under the color of justice without prejudice.” Conrad 
Lynn concurred. “I’m much more bitter about life and what’s happened to them 
than they are,” Lynn wrote, having worked the trial since its inception. “They’re 
angry naturally about what’s gone on these eight years, but they’ve developed a 
philosophy of life that’s much more serene than I’ll ever have.” In that moment, 
the decision was to be made by Justice Martinis, who had two options: declare 
a retrial or dismiss the original indictment altogether.40
Justice Martinis’s self-designated March 8 deadline came, and all signs 
pointed to a fifth trial for the four defendants. That was until, perhaps the most 
significant turning point in the case, the key prosecution witness, Robert Barnes 
Jr., confessed to his probation officer that “his testimony [against the Harlem 
Six] was a lie.” Aside from the testimony of “two small girls who testified 
that they had seen the defendants near the murder scene,” the prosecution’s 
case rested largely with Barnes, who the prosecution described as an original 
coconspirator in the murder plan. For the defense, this new information was a 
gold mine. Lynn’s group argued that if Barnes did not participate in the murder 
case, “it then becomes obvious the police and other public officials involved 
most certainly engaged in the wilful [sic] subornation of perjury.” In the event 
that this holds true, it would be argued that the prosecution changed the character 
of Barnes’s participation in the crimes “to exculpate him and implicate these 
defendants therein.” The defense called for an immediate release of the four 
defendants and a thorough criminal investigation of the new findings. Whether 
or not Justice Martinis was impacted by this information, it did lead to a number 
of immediate changes, including the reduction of the bail fee, which was posted, 
and the four defendants were released from the Manhattan House of Detention 
on March 31, 1972.41
The “freedom” of the Harlem Four was short lived, and by the summer 
of 1972, they were summoned for another trial. Lynn and Kunstler worried 
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about another trial because they believed the choice language of the justice 
was “deliberately designed to inflame and prejudice the future jurors.” They 
were, however, prepared to report the progress their defendants made in the 
few months of freedom: Felder was accepted into City College of New York 
and was scheduled to attend in September, Craig was enrolled at Harlem Prep, 
Thomas was working as a legal aide at the Morrisania Legal Services Clinic, 
and Baker was actively participating in community work. Justice Martinis 
acknowledged their “commendable” progress but called for another retrial 
because he believed the defense sympathizers “violated the general principles 
of decency and ‘subjected’ both himself and the jurors to ‘unfair pressures.’” 
But the defense was ready and believed that Barnes’s admission to lying, which 
was submitted in a thirty-eight-page affidavit, gave them what was needed to 
finally end this case. And it did.42
Then, on April 4, 1973, almost nine years to the day and just days before 
the retrial was scheduled to begin, the Harlem Four were finally freed after 
pleading guilty to manslaughter charges. The decision was complicated, as the 
four (now men) proclaimed their innocence. “We’ve said all along we are not 
guilty and what we feel the world should know is that we are still not guilty,” 
Craig told reporters at a news conference. “We hope our friends, our mothers, 
our fathers, anybody who cares will understand why we had to do this, why 
we had to make this decision.” For the Harlem Four, the certainty of freedom, 
even at the price of a criminal record, was the better option than facing the 
uncertainty of another trial. Later, Supreme Court Justice Jacob Grumet, who 
took the place of Martinis, made “a highly unusual move” to grant the four a 
certificate of relief from disability. “I want[ed] them to have every chance,” 
Justice Grument explained, defending his decision to assure that the Harlem 
Four would not lose any rights or privileges commonly stripped of convicted 
felons. For all intents and purposes, William Craig, Wallace Baker, Walter 
Thomas, and Ronald Felder were free.43
The fates of Daniel Hamm and Robert Rice were yet to be determined. 
For Lynn and his defense team, their focus shifted on procuring the same 
freedoms as their other Harlem Six comrades. Hamm, who continued to serve 
his sentence at Auburn prison in upstate New York for his guilty plea, was 
denied his first parole opportunity “on the basis of new information.” The 
Charter Group for a Pledge of Conscience, a small community organization 
composed of mainly Harlem residents, printed “An Appeal to the Community” 
on behalf of Hamm, and they urged, “ANY MEMBER OF THE COMMUNITY 
WHO KNOWS ANYTHING ABOUT THIS ALLEGED ‘CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMATION’—PLEASE COME FORWARD SO THAT IT CAN BE 
PUBLICLY EXAMINED.” As a result of a combination of the group’s effort 
and the persistence of Lynn and his associates, Hamm was released in 1974.44
Rice, who the defense team figured would be released after a federal judge 
dismissed his murder conviction in September 1973, experienced the least good 
fortune. He went on to face five additional trials and seven appeals with no 
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break. His mother continued her advocacy and used the New York Amsterdam 
News as an outlet for support. Mrs. Rice wrote “An Appeal to the Harlem 
Community for Help to Free My Son, Robert Rice,” which was printed in the 
distinguished black newspaper, urging New York Governor Hugh Carey to 
grant her son clemency. Having spent twelve years in prison, Rice was “the 
only one of the Harlem Six still behind bars.” Unfortunately, because of the 
bloc of Mrs. Rice’s plea and the tireless effort of Lynn and his defense team, 
clemency was not granted. Rice continued to serve his sentence; he went up for 
parole in March 1988, and he was finally released in November 1991.45
“Your concern for the children brought about a change in your life,” Craig 
wrote in a note to Wallace Baker. “You, Wallace, was caught in the middle of 
hells front door, while I tried hard to fight my way to your side,” he recounted 
of the fruit stand melee, “But the ocean of blue uniforms stoped [sic] me in my 
tracks.” Even years after, Craig admittedly remembers every detail “because 
the effects of those blows changed both our lives.” As black youths growing 
up in postwar Harlem, the odds were already stacked against them. In a note to 
Conrad Lynn, Truman Nelson affirmed, “They know the struggle will not end 
with them, or perhaps even their grandsons, but they have made a contribution 
with the dignity and strength with which they have fought the good fight.” But 
such affirmation was embedded. “I’m well aware that it’s not justice. And I’m 
sure it’s not equality,” William Craig wrote the state of the justice system in 
America. “But through it all the ‘Harlem 6’ will maintain strength to fight the 
struggle against racism, fascism, oppression, injustice, and exploitation.”46
In its time, the case of the Harlem Six captured national headlines and 
international audiences, yet its significance continues to escape the memory 
and record of many. The case, ignited by the 1964 death of a white shopkeeper 
in New York City, and its subsequent events were emblematic of black youth 
experiences with the carceral state as the nation embarked on its War on Crime. 
The lived experiences of these six youths reveal that by the 1960s, constructions 
of criminality were reestablished as a racial problem that would continue to 
face more punitive state responses influenced by broader discourse on youth, 
race, and crime. The Harlem Six persevered through a justice system that, 
long before them, decided to attribute race as the determining factor for those 
presumed innocent and those presumed criminal.
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